What should us policy be in syria

Follow him on Twitter: AbdulrhmanMasri. By Jomana Qaddour , Abdulrahman al-Masri. By Frederic C. Regardless of what the Biden administration may wish to think or acknowledge, it may well be sitting for an initial examination administered by Bashar al-Assad—the teacher of many harsh lessons to American presidents. Failing the test will not be consequence-free. By William Christou and Karam Shaar. Unless a political settlement is reached and the sanctions are lifted to enable reconstruction, the economy of regime-held Syria will continue to struggle.

Image: U. Picture taken September 8, Past in action and present deadlock Throughout the past decade, the US suffered from two interdependent policy incoherencies pertaining to the Syrian conflict. Earlier this month, the international community watched with deep concern as the regime appeared poised to mount a brutal offensive.

An agreement between Russia and Turkey to establish a de-militarized zone in Idlib forestalled the offensive, at least temporarily. Russia and Turkey will jointly oversee the zone which should be cleared of all extremist elements and heavy weaponry by October Several issues could lead to an unraveling of the agreement. Most prominently, Turkey may not manage to clear the zone of extremist elements or persuade its allies to relinquish their heavy weapons.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime vows that it will reassert control over the province, a non-starter for rebel groups on the ground. At best, the agreement will buy time for more intensive diplomacy. The humanitarian cost will be high should the current agreement collapse. An estimated three million civilians, including one million children, currently reside in Idlib. Damascus has prosecuted its campaign to consolidate control with extreme brutality, imperiling Syrian civilians.

The Assad regime repeatedly has transgressed international norms and laws governing armed conflict. It has used chemical weapons, bombed civilians indiscriminately and deliberately targeted medical facilities.

This past April, in its battle to reclaim the Damascus suburbs, the regime used chemical weapons in an attack that left more than 40 civilians dead. The United States, together with British and French allies, responded with coordinated strikes hitting chemical weapons-related sites.

Tehran has supported Assad with troops, weapons and funding. Hard numbers are difficult to confirm but estimates range from several hundred to a few thousand Iranian troops in Syria.

Tehran has also mobilized up to 25, fighters from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Lebanon, including several thousand Hezbollah fighters. Iranian fighters and their proxies have been deployed to nearly 40 facilities across Syria. Tehran has also supplied the Assad regime significant amounts of arms and military equipment.

While Israel has acquiesced to the Assad regime remaining in power, Jerusalem has underscored it will not tolerate a permanent Iranian military presence in Syria nor allow for the transfer or production of precision-guided missiles. Israel has also made clear it will enforce these red lines. The Israeli Intelligence Minister recently revealed that Israel has undertaken military attacks against Iranian targets in Syria over the past two years.

Neither Israel nor Iran appears to be interested in all-out war, but they may be on a dangerous collision course. Israel wants to prevent Iran from transforming Syria into another Lebanon. Iran wants to preserve and deepen its presence in Syria.

A shadow war is already playing out between Israel and Iran in Syria, and prospects for continued escalation remain high. The most significant danger is that hostilities between Israel and Iran escalate into a conflict that spirals out of control.

In response to the shootdown, Moscow announced plans to send an S missile defense system to Syria, adding yet another layer of complexity. Second, as the military campaign against ISIS enters its final phase, new conflicts and fault lines are emerging. Turkish-Kurdish Conflict. A change of U. Order from Chaos. A how-to guide for managing the end of the post-Cold War era. Read all the Order from Chaos content ». Editor's Note: After ten years of civil war in Syria, the Biden administration has an opportunity to reengage with the diplomatic process and identify a new framework to end the suffering of the Syrian people.

Order from Chaos The exemplary U. Order from Chaos After 7 years of war, Assad has won in Syria. Mara Karlin. McHaty and Joe Moye. Related Books.

Bending History By Martin S. This Atlantic Council report reflects, therefore, the considered views of the author. It differs from the Syria Study Group report mainly in terms of specifically identifying the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as the central problem from which all other challenges to American national security—such as the Islamic State ISIS and al-Qaeda—flows.

It goes far beyond the Syria Study Group report in strongly emphasizing the geopolitical and humanitarian necessity of countering and neutralizing—with military means, where necessary—the mass homicide survival strategy of the Assad terrorist regime. The Atlantic Council report also argues that the incomplete defeat of ISIS in northeastern Syria offers the opportunity for a Syrian governance alternative to the Assad regime to take root if the United States and its allies engage effectively in post-combat stabilization and nurture local Syrian governance reflecting the consent of the governed.

The Syria Study Group has succeeded—at least momentarily—in getting Syria back into the news and onto the editorial pages. This report seeks, however, to supplement the final report of the Syria Study Group by adding emphasis to strategic priorities deemed essential by the author. The objective of the United States in Syria must be a full political transition from criminal, terrorist rule by family and entourage to a consensual, legitimate system featuring rule of law.

Its achievement would, barring unanticipated regime collapse, take years of patient, focused, and disciplined effort. Indeed, there is no peace. More than a quarter of the prewar population has fled the country.

Another quarter is internally displaced. Moreover, important parts of Syria remain beyond the control of the regime, its state terror apparatus, and its allies.

US forces also control the al-Tanf military garrison in southeastern Syria, astride a land route important to Iran. Still, the United States has the option of deciding that political transition in Syria is a bridge too far; that a declaration of victory over ISIS and complete disengagement is a prudent course of action.

Russia and Iran have, after all, stabilized the Assad regime to the point where it feels empowered to reject peace talks. Moreover, the prospect of disengagement may appear as the lifting of a heavy burden. The president could, if he wishes, decide to disengage the United States totally from Syria. Set aside the reality that what happens in Syria does not stay there. Still, the view here is that a presidential decision to wash his hands of Syria would receive strong majority support in public opinion polling.

Would an effort of five years to bring about the enduring defeat of ISIS be wasted by near-term American disengagement? If liberated northeastern Syria is turned over to the Assad regime and its Iranian ally, what would prevent them from offering some at-large, skilled ISIS terrorists the option of employment for terror operations? Damascus and Tehran both have long histories of using Islamist terrorists for their own purposes. The US intelligence community fears this very prospect. Would the Assad regime state terror be a better option for suppressing ISIS than effective local governance based on rule of law?

Can the United States obtain for its Syrian partners—mainly Kurds, who have provided the ground force combat component of the war on ISIS—protection from the violent excesses of the Assad regime if the American presence in Syria is liquidated?

If not, a what would become of those who have worked with the United States, and b what might be the implications of abandonment for future American attempts globally to partner with indigenous forces?

What would be the implications for regional friends and European allies if the United States were to disengage from Syria? How likely is it that the Assad regime would repatriate six million refugees who fled its violence?

What is the ability and inclination of the Assad regime to rule in a way that would preclude further massive refugee flows? Can the Assad regime refrain from kleptocracy and preside competently over a reconstruction process that would stabilize Syria politically and economically?

Or—if shedding a heavy burden is what drives US policy—would the abandonment of friends and allies adjacent to Syria and in Western Europe be the inevitable adjunct to disengagement from Syria itself? If the administration believes as it does that the Assad regime and in particular Iran enable, inspire, and accelerate the phenomenon of global Islamist terrorism and extremism, 12 Heather Nauert.

Recognizing that disengagement is not a cost-free option—that negative and unintended consequences will result—is essential. But this recognition does not suffice for policy formulation. If Syrian political transition is the goal, how to achieve it? What are the key elements of strategy? Kremlin accusations notwithstanding, there is a long-standing American political consensus that violent regime change should not be an element of US strategy.

Invading and occupying Syria has never been on the American agenda. American aid to Syrian rebels resisting state terror was never of a quality or quantity to drive the regime from Damascus. That aid was unilaterally terminated in Instead, since the early stages of the Syrian uprising, the preferred American route to political transition has been one of Syrian peace negotiations under United Nations UN auspices.

The Geneva Final Communique of June 30, , embodied an agreement between the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council that Syrian negotiators should populate, through mutual consent, a transitional governing body exercising full executive power in Syria while preserving governmental structures.

But the Assad regime rejected Geneva, spurned political transition, and mocked substantive peace negotiations. Regime opposition caused Russia to renege on that to which it agreed in